

SECRET

85-2669/11

OLL 85-2192/1  
30 July 1985

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing (September 1985) on Security and  
Counterintelligence/Director of Security Briefing  
for SSCI Staffers

REFERENCE: OLL 85-2192; 26 July 1985

1. On 30 July, the Director of Security gave a briefing on the CIA Personnel Security Program to three of the four SSCI staffers who are preparing for SSCI hearings on security and counterintelligence to be conducted in September 1985. The following individuals participated:

CIA: [redacted] Director of Security  
[redacted] Deputy Director for  
Personnel Security and Investigations

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[redacted] OLL  
[redacted] OLL

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SSCI: Ed Levine  
John Elliff  
Charles Battaglia

Jim Dykstra, the fourth SSCI staffer involved in planning for the hearing, did not attend the briefing.

2. Elliff opened the over two-hour session with a restatement of the factors that led up to the hearing, and the intent of the Committee to be constructive in resolving security problems (see reference). He stated that the staff wants to advise Members after the August recess how to interface more effectively with the Executive Branch.

3. [redacted] gave a comprehensive overview of the functions and organization of the Office of Security (OS). The following subjects were covered:

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Organization

A. Positions: [redacted] (officer, technical and clerical)  
in OS; plus [redacted] area security  
officers in components;

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Structure: D/SEC reports directly to DDA; has direct contact as needed with DCI, DDCI and EX/DIR.

B. Four Functional Directorates:

Personnel Security and Investigations

[redacted] 25X1  
Is most important and largest division because of the critical need for reliable and trustworthy people. Every individual who will have access to CIA classified information must have OS clearance and approval. While small compared to FBI and DIS, CIA's program is the strongest in the nation. We have had our own investigative apparatus since the 1950's and need not rely on any other agency.

[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1

C. Policy and Management Division [redacted] 25X1

D. Technical Security Division [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] explained the rationale for this new division. It will be responsible for an interdisciplinary survey of the wide variety of types of technical penetration. Its responsibilities include communication security, computer security, [redacted] and technical countermeasures surveys. 25X1

E. Physical and Area Security [redacted] 25X1

This division is charged with facility security of all domestic and overseas sites where our people and data are. It has surveys and inspections of overseas, domestic and industrial locations, looks at security standards for all work areas and many overseas residences, and monitors people overseas. [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1

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4. Of particular interest to the staffers was the relationship and division of labor between the Counter-intelligence Staff and the Security Analysis Group. Mr. [ ] stressed that the two groups worked together very closely and that the Security Analysis group focussed on less serious, non-CI matters. He described this group as 12 hand-picked, highly-skilled professional officers who maintained close communication with the CI staff and, except for one-on-one polygraphs, conducted joint interviews whenever appropriate. There were a few questions regarding the Scranage Case and [ ] clarified Agency reactions which appear to the staffers as inadequate.

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5. [ ] took this occasion to stress the Agency's interest in leaks legislation, and in an interagency polygraph school. The staffers were mildly responsive and noncommittal.

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6. The rest of the briefing was a straightforward description of applicant security approval procedures and policy. [ ] discussed the typical steps in clearance, the value of psychological testing, use of polygraph, the reasons for security disapprovals, the difference between security and suitability issues, and the value of the extensive background investigation which includes checks on applicants' neighborhoods.

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7. The staffers indicated that they found the briefing very helpful, would have liked to have gone on another few hours, and would likely request additional CIA security briefings.

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[ ]  
Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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## Distribution:

Original - OLL Record

1 - OLL Chrono

1 - DDA

1 - D/OS

1 - C/LD

1 - C/LEG

1 - C/SL

1 - [ ] Subject

1 - [ ] Chrono

OLL:LD: [ ] (22 August 1985)

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
~~SECRET~~OLL 85-2552  
23 August 1985

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for GAO Staffers on CIA Training of  
Polygraphers

1. On 5 August, representatives of Polygraph Division, Office of Security, briefed GAO staffers on CIA training of polygraphers. The following individuals participated in the briefing:

CIA:

Chief, Polygraph Division  
Deputy Chief, Polygraph  
Division  
Chief, Polygraph Training  
and Research  
Office of Legislative Liaison

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GAO: Irving Boker  
Wanda Avila  
Uldis Adansons

2. The Senate Armed Services Committee has requested a GAO evaluation of DOD polygrapher training and the feasibility of expanding that training. To that end, GAO is meeting with other organizations that conduct polygrapher training. GAO must provide a report to the Committee by the end of this calendar year. The GAO staffers agreed to consider the briefing at the SECRET level and to coordinate a draft report with CIA prior to publication.

3. The history of CIA polygrapher training was reviewed. The polygraph program was started in 1949 and through the early 1950's most CIA polygraphers were trained at the Leonard Keeler Institute in Chicago. Over the years, CIA developed in-house tutorial training tailored to Agency needs to screen applicants and agents. We had a formal curriculum and no formal school. In 1976-77, CIA went to the John Reed School in Chicago for basic training and apprenticeship, and had follow-up in-house training tailored to CIA practices.

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4. In late 1982, we had the first CIA polygrapher class and the seventh class will begin in September. We have averaged four students to a class and will have 12 next September. The course now lasts 15 1/2 weeks. In it there are many practical exercises and videotape is used. There are 11 weeks of classroom instruction, occasional monitoring of live cases, and in the last four weeks students run live cases at Headquarters under close supervision of instructors. The school is accredited, and it meets or exceeds all APA requirements.

5. In lieu of a formal apprentice program, students are turned over to a Headquarters line supervisor, and are closely watched. New polygraphers begin with applicants, then move on to the more complex polygraph examinations including the reinvestigation program, overseas, and industrial polygraphs.

6. CIA polygraphers are very carefully screened. All meet the standards, including a college degree, for employment with OS and their aptitudes and motives are carefully assessed. Only one student has not been able to complete the training and he was reassigned by mutual agreement. Most polygraphers come from the Security career service, work an average of four years as polygraphers, and move onto another OS discipline. We turn down many commercial examiners who apply for employment because of their inadequate training, lower standards, and emphasis on criminal investigation. (CIA does no criminal investigative polygraph testing, with the rare exception of some internal exams.) All polygraphers are volunteers, there is no age requirement, and many more individuals apply than are accepted. It is estimated that out of 150 files reviewed over the course of one year, we accept six. We have a current strength of around  polygraphers and our goal is to have  line examiners.

7. CIA exercises very formalized quality control procedures. No examiner, irrespective of grade or position, is exempt from having the chart checked while the subject is still in the room. When the charts are approved, the subject is released. All differences of opinion are discussed and resolved. This, of course, is not a viable procedure in the field; charts are returned to Headquarters, reviewed, and decisions are upheld or overturned. There are six to eight examiners under one supervisor; there is no need to keep statistics on the results of polygraph reviews because of this small span of control. On the average, a polygrapher completes two applicant polygraphs a day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.

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
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8. There was some discussion of the differences between CIA and DOD polygraph training and application.

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

Distribution:

Original - OLL Record

1 - OLL Chrono


1 - DDA

1 - D/OS

1 - C/Polygraph Division/OS

1 - C/LD

1 - C/LEG

1 -  Subject

1 -  Chrono

OLL:LD:  (26 August 1985)

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CONFIDENTIAL

OLL 85-2556

8 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing on CIA Selection Process and Security  
Approval for Andrew Feinstein, Staff Director,  
Civil Service Subcommittee/House Post Office,  
Civil Service Committee

1. On 8 August, I gave a two-hour briefing to Andrew Feinstein, Staff Director, Civil Service Subcommittee/House Post Office, Civil Service Committee. Feinstein initially requested a briefing on the CIA personnel selection process with emphasis on security approval and stated that his committee had jurisdiction over such matters and that he was involved with the "Stilwell Commission". After several telephone conversations, Feinstein revised his request: he sees that personnel security is a hot issue today and he wants to be informed because there is a chance that relevant legislation will eventually be referred to his Committee. As for the Stilwell Commission, he is scheduled to interview one of the participants on 9 August.

2. At the outset of the briefing, I stated that we were willing to talk with him in the context of cooperation because his Committee very likely would deal with legislation on some aspect of personnel security. I clarified that HPSCI had direct jurisdiction over CIA policy and procedures, but we were concerned over personnel security government wide, and over potential legislation and other activity in the wake of recent espionage revelations. I also stated that he should treat the overall briefing as secret and for his background information only. He agreed to check with me prior to making any use of the information.

3. I presented general and anecdotal information and avoided specifics and legal issues lest they come back to haunt us. I gave an overview of the selection process and emphasized CIA's policy of considering the whole person for employment and basing hire/no hire decisions on multi-sourced information. Of particular interest to Feinstein was our use of psychological testing, the initial security indoctrination, security awareness programs and security counseling.

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4. Insofar as CIA personnel security practices, I paraphrased the guidelines published in DCI Directive 1/14. As for our use of psychological testing, I offered general information on the categories of employees who were tested, and on the value of the results in assessing performance potential and suitability. I dispelled him of the notion that it was possible to readily detect a "spy" from the results of a battery of tests.

5. Feinstein said he was satisfied and requested no additional briefings.

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL\

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1 - OLL Chrono

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1 - Subject

1 - Chrono

OLL:LD: aw (26 August 1985)

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE <i>31 Jul</i>
TO: <i>DDA</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>EXO/DDA <i>Bu 31-7</i></p> <p>ADDA <i>J 31 JUL 1985</i></p> <p>DDA <i>J 31 AUG 1985</i></p> <p>DDA REGISTRY _____</p> <p>OS RECEIVED A COPY.</p>		
FROM: <i>OLL LEO</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO.  
1 FEB 56 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



Deputy Director  
for Administration

*D/O L Y 232*

*Chuck,*

*I am sure you  
have seen this.*



*Thanks. In fact, I had not.*

*↓*



*DDA [Signature]*

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85-2669

OLL 85-2192  
26 July 1985

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing (September 1985) on Security and Counterintelligence/Preparatory Discussion Between Director of Security and Charles Battaglia

1. On 26 July, Charles Battaglia, SSCI staffer, and [redacted] Director of Security, met to discuss CIA support for SSCI hearings on Security and counterintelligence to be held in September 1985.

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2. Battaglia explained that the genesis for the hearings included the Chairman's interest in pursuing the subject with the possibility of developing tighter legislation, the Walker case which has stimulated widespread interest, and the Byrd resolution which called for a national commission to look into the issues, a move the SSCI wanted to block. Battaglia stated that the SSCI is working with the Administration in this endeavor; scheduled next week is a strategy meeting with the National Security Policy Group, National Security Council. [redacted] advised that security problems already have extremely high visibility and now the need is to orchestrate the multitude of groups (e.g. Inman Panel, Gen. Stilwell group) that are working the issues. Battaglia agreed that the SSCI should build on previous work and avoid duplication and overlap whenever possible. He stated that an expected outcome from the hearings would be some immediate and long-term solutions to security problems. He described the mood in Congress to be very positive,--that the Members want to help rather than get in the way of security professionals who can do the job with adequate funding.

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3. Battaglia stated that he wanted briefings in personnel security (a broad perspective of policy and procedures), information security and industrial security. Eventually, he wants to be able to compare the approaches used by different Intelligence Community elements. Examples he cited are the screening programs (human reliability, use of psychological testing), and background investigations (the extensive CIA background investigation vs. DOD's IBI interview format). Physical/technical security, with the exception of its functions in industrial security, will not be a primary subject in the hearings.

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4. It was agreed that [ ] will brief (30 July, 1000 at SSCI) on CIA's personnel Security program. As time and interest warrant, he will cover CIA's polygraph program. Battaglia expects the three or four other staffers involved in the hearing to attend.

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5. Also discussed was CIA's use of psychological testing as a screening tool. [ ] underscored its importance and stated that most agencies did vocational testing rather than the more complex analysis conducted by CIA. Battaglia wants a briefing on the CIA program.

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6. Battaglia mentioned that he was highly impressed with the SSCI security procedures with the exception of use of the telephone. He stated that there is only one secure phone in Committee offices and he is the only one that uses it. [ ] stated Agency willingness to assist in having more secure phones installed, and Battaglia said he did not want to pursue this now but would at a later time.

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Liaison Division

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

## Distribution:

Original - OLL Record  
 1 - OLL Chrono  
 1 - DDA  
 1 - D/OS  
 1 - Chief, Senate Liaison  
 1 - [ ] Subject  
 1 - [ ] Chrono

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